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ABSTRACT
An experiment was performed in the Space Station Proximity
Operations Simulator at the NASA Ames Research Center.
Five test subjects were instructed to perform twenty simulated
remote docking maneuvers of an orbital maneuvering vehicle
(OMV) to the space station in which they were located. The
OMV started from an initial range of 304.8 m (1000 ft) on the
space station's negative velocity vector (-V-bar). Anomalous
out-of-plane thruster firings of various magnitudes (simulating
a faulty thruster) occurred at one of five ranges from the target.
Initial velocity, range of anomalous bum, and magnitude of
anomalous bum were the factors varied. In addition to
whether the trial was successful, time and fuel to return to a
nominal trajectory, total mission duration, total fuel
consumption (Av), and time histories of commanded burns
were recorded. Analyses of the results added support to the
hypothesis that slow approach velocities are not inherently
safer than their more rapid counterparts. Naive subjects were
capable of docking successfully at velocities faster than those
prescribed by the "0.1% Rule" even when a simulated faulty
thruster disturbed the nominal trajectory. Little to no
justification for slow approach velocities remains from a
human factors standpoint.
INTRODUCTION
The docking of two spacecraft is a complicated task whose
failure could result in the loss of mission, vehicle, or crew.
Spacecraft have typically been flown at small relative velocities
in rendezvous and docking maneuvers both to increase safety
margins in the event of an incorrect burn, and to minimize
plume impingement and fuel consumption. Current astronauts
are instructed in the use of a "0.1% rule" which suggests that
the approach velocity be no greater than 0. I% of the range to
the target. (At a range of 1000 ft, the approach velocity would
be 1 ft/s. After 100 s, the vehicle would arrive at a range of
900 ft and the rate would be reduced to 0.9 ft/s.) 1 By
decreasing the relative velocity with which one vehicle
approaches another, demands upon reaction time are relaxed
and workload is simultaneously (and proportionately) reduced
as the number of required inputs per unit time decreases.
However, surveys of aircraft and workload literature reveal
that too low a workload may be just as dangerous as too high a
workload.2, 3 Small approach velocities produce long mission
durations where inactivity may lead to reduced attention, or
sustained vigilance may lead to excessive fatigue. Long
mission durations also may prove to be inordinately expensive
in an operational space station era in terms of the time the crew
are using to dock and not performing other duties.
(However, fuel costs may obscure any such advantage for
nominal missions.) Previous research revealed no statistically
significant increase in failure rate with increased velocity;
failure rate was more dependent upon a subject's risk profile
than the velocity at which his/her docking maneuver began. 4,
5
In general, very little human factors research in the area of
piloting space maneuvers has been documented in the United
States space program. 4I6 Analytical engineering tests have
been used to generate rules of thumb and verify strategies from
a systems point of view without regard to man-in-the-loop
considerations. This study is part of a series seeking to rectify
that situation and is directed toward developing a unified
theory and comprehensive database for human performance
aspects of spacecraft control.
Current and future work is concerned with determining the
feasibility of expanding the operational performance envelope
to include more rapid dockings at higher average velocities
without increasing the probability of failure. The Soviets have
also expressed a desire for manual control to "operate in [a]
wider range."i7 Quicker dockings are important not only for
increasing productivity but also for improving the likelihood of
a successful rescue of a stranded crewperson or spacecraft low
on consumables. In nominal missions, saving time at the
expense of fuel may not be cost effective. However,
contingencies may arise when the cost of time is extreme as in
a rescue operation. One goal of this line of research is
discovering the fastest safe docking times should rapid
docking be required.
METHODS AND APPARATUS
The Space Station Proximity Operations Simulator at NASA
Ames Research Center is a real-time flight simulator with
which researchers have been studying docking maneuvers and
other proximity operations for several years. It consists of
three windows on which computer graphics images of stars
and orbiting vehicles are presented, a 3-degree-of-freedom
(DOF) hand controller, and other assorted controls and
displays.7, 14 The windows face the minus velocity vector (-
V-bar) of a space station in a 270 nm orbit about the Earth.
From this perspective, X is positive through the operator's
back, Y is positive to the left, and Z is positive down.
Five test subjects (3 male, 2 female) each performed 20
simulated docking maneuvers commencing from 304.8 m
(1000 ft) on the -V-bar. The trials began at one of five initial
velocities: 0.3, 0.9, 1.9, 2.9, 3.6 m/s. A faulty thruster was
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simulated during each run by an anomalous out-of-plane burn
of a preestablished magnitude at a preestablished range. The
magnitude of the anomaly was one of five Avs (0.0, 0.2, 0.5,
0.8, 1.0 m/s) and occurred at one of five ranges (20, 45, 85,
125, 150 m) from the target. A response surface methodology
arrangement was used to reduce the total number of initial
conditions from 5 x 5 x 5 = 125 to 20.18 The subjects were
cautioned to be wary of an unexpected incident but until the
f'trst trial containing an anomaly, did not know what form the
anomaly would take. Each subject started from the following
20 initial conditions, but in different random orders.
Initial Velocity Range Magnitude
(m/s) (m) (m/s)
1.9 85 .5
.9 45 .8
1.9 85 .5
1.9 20 .5
3.6 85 .5
.9 125 .8
.9 45 .2
2.9 45 .8
1.9 85 1.0
2.9 45 .2
2.9 125 .2
1.9 85 .5
1.9 85 .5
1.9 85 0.0
1.9 85 .5
1.9 150 .5
.3 85 .5
2.9 125 .8
1.9 85 .5
.9 125 .2
A successful docking was operationally defined as satisfying
the following range and rate conditions upon contact with the
space station. At a range of 2 m from the station's center of
mass axial velocity must be no greater than 0.15 m/s, up/down
and fight/left range no greater than 0.23 m, and up/down and
right/left velocity no greater 0.6 m/s. 19 In addition to whether
the docking was successful, total mission duration, fuel
consumption (measured in Av), time out-of-plane
("awaytime"), out-of-plane fuel ("y delta V"), and
temporal/spatial histories of pilot bums were recorded for each
simulated mission. Also, two derived quantities known as
"reserve time" and "radial delta V", were obtained by
subtracting a reference time/fuel from the mission duration/fuel
consumption values. 45
RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the burn history versus range on the x-axis for
a typical trial for one of the subjects. The initial velocity was
0.9 m/s, and an anomalous burn of 0.8 m/s occurred at an x-
range of 125 m. For this trial, total mission duration was 498
s, total velocity increment (delta V) was 7.51 m/s, awaytime
was 249 s and Y delta V was 1.88 m/s.
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Figure 1: Thruster commands, naive pilot
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Figure 2 shows an expert pilot's response to the same initial
conditions. Mission duration, delta V, awaytime, and Y delta
V quantities were all lower than the test subject's with values
of 380 s, 4.92 m/s, 9 s, and 1.32 m/s respectively. The expert
pilot's superior response is more likely due to several year's
intensive experience with simulated spacecraft docking
maneuvers than any innate ability,
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Figure 2: Thruster commands, expert pilot
While both trials ffere successful, the expert used fuel more
effectively and efficiently as evidenced by the lower total
velocity increment and by the smoother, and less active, burn
history plots. He also recovered from the anomaly in under
4% of the test subject's time and then focused on slowing
down the vehicle to satisfy the final docking conditions. Also,
while mission duration generally varies inversely with fuel
consumption (more fuel is required to travel faster and reduce
time), the expert managed to reduce overall time without
expending additional fuel by using every bum efficiently and
minimizing pilot-induced oscillations.
Multiple regression analyses were performed on the data to
establish the existence of any statistically significant effects.
Analyses were performed not only on the whole data but also
on the data after points outside the semiinterquartile range
(outliers) had been removed, and after data associated with
unsuccessful attempts were removed. Initial velocity, range,
magnitude and trial were the independent variables analyzed in
each case.
As in earlier studies 4-5, two variables, "reserve time" and
"radial velocity increment", were derived from the mission
duration and delta V data since increases in initial velocity
generally "force" the mission duration to decrease and the fuel
consumption to increase. Reserve time was calculated by
dividing the initial range by the initial velocity and subtracting
this value from the measured mission duration. In this way,
the effect of the initial velocity is somewhat removed from the
measurement and what is left is the time the test subject
reserved for herself to accomplish the task successfully. The
radial velocity increment values were obtained by subtracting
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thestartingandstoppingAvandtheYdeltaVfromthe total
delta V.
Two other variables were created to evaluate the final 3-axis
range and rate parameters as something besides the binary
successful/unsuccessful. "Squared" was computed by
summing the squares of the terminal range and rate values
along the three axes. "Abs" is the sum of the absolute
differences between the actual terminal range and rate values
and those required for a successful docking.
squared -- y2 + Z2 + Xrate 2 + Yrate 2 + Zrate 2
abs = -((absfY) -.23) + (abs(Z) - .23)+ (abs(Xrate) -. 15) +
(absfYrate) - .06) + (abs(Zrate) - .06))
Since the inclusion of outlying data points greatly compressed
most of the data, these points were removed and regression
analyses were recalculated. Removing outlying data points
served to reduce the variance of the data and increased the
likelihood of statistical significance. A list of all statistically
significant effects from response surface analysis appears in
table 1.
Table 1: Significant Effects
Dependent Variable Significant t-statistic p
Factor(s)
Total Data
Mission Duration init. vel. -5.43 < .001
Velocity Increment trial -2.78 .006
Y Vel. Inc. trial -3.18 .002
Z Vel. Inc. trial -2.77 .007
init. vel. -2.12 .036
Squared init. vel. -2.08 .040
Abs. init. vel. 2.35 .021
Without Outliers
Mission Duration init. vel. -5.59 < .001
trial 2.55 .013
Velocity Increment init. vel. 3.93 < .001
magnitude 3.16 .002
Y Vel. Inc. magnitude 5.04 < .001
Reserve Time init. vel. 2.30 .024
trial 2.53 .013
Squared magnitude 2.01 .047
trial -2.43 .018
Abs. trial 2.69 .009
Successful Runs
Mission Duration init. vel. -3.27 .002
Velocity Increment magnitude 2.41 .020
Y Vel. Inc. magnitude 2.15 .036
trial -2.22 .031
Z Vel. Inc. magnitude 2.49 .016
Away, time magnitude 2.24 .029
T-Tests were performed between data collected from
successful docking missions and those collected from
unsuccessful missions. The only variable for which there was
a statistically significant difference was trial (4.20, p < .001)
whose average was 12 for the successful missions and 8 for
the unsuccessful.
DISCUSSION
As in earlier studies without anomalies, mission duration was
inversely related to initial velocity. 4"5 This relationship is not
surprising considering that the faster one travels, the less time
a trip of a given distance will take. The fact that this
relationship was preserved when the anomalous thruster
firings were included means that subjects did not slow down
from fast initial velocities in order to recover from the
"accident." Starting off at a high velocity caused the shortest
mission durations despite the occurrence of anything unusual.
Apparently, plenty of time was available for recovery even at
an initial velocity as high as 3.6 rrds.
Removing the outliers, thereby decreasing the variance of the
data, revealed a practice effect: trial became a significant factor
determining mission duration. Some .practice effoct was
expected but the scatter of all the raw data points obscured it.
Removing the data associated With the unsuccessful runs
eliminated the practice effect while maintaining the velocity
effect. Since practice both increased the likelihood of success
and decreased the mission duration, removing the
unsuccessful runs also eliminated the long duration runs
thereby eliminating a perceived practice effect when the data
from the unsuccessful runs were removed.
Vehicles should pay for accelerating to, and decelerating from,
higher velocities with higher fuel consumption (Av). In the
former study, there was a direct linear relationship between
velocity increment and initial velocity as intuition would
suggest. However, in the current experiment, delta V was
solely a function of trial indicating a practice effect.
Apparently, the inclusion of the anomalies destroyed the effect
of velocity on Av.
Delta V data without outliers not only show a velocity effect,
but also indicate an effect based upon the magnitude of the
anomalous burn and omit an effect based upon experience.
Clearing out the spurious data left two expected relationships:
the velocity increment increased with initial velocity and with
magnitude of the anomaly. Removing the data collected from
the unsuccessful missions left only the magnitude effect.
Awaytime was correlated with magnitude. That is, the larger
the magnitude of the out-of-plane burn, the longer it took to
recover to the same plane as the space station. This effect
disappeared when the outliers were removed but existed when
only the unsuccessful data were removed. Since awaytime is
bounded on the bottom by 0, removing the high, outlying data
points eliminated any chance for the high awaytimes to be
associated with the high magnitudes.
Y delta V, like total delta V exhibited a practice effect when all
of the data were included and had only a magnitude effect
when the outliers were removed. However, unlike total Av, Y
delta V had an effect of trial when the data collected from the
unsuccessful missions were ignored. The trial effect is only
evident when the outliers are included in the calculation.
Squared and abs both displayed a velocity effect when all of
the data were used and neither showed any main effects when
the unsuccessful data were removed. Squared had both a
magnitude and a trial effect when the outlying data were
removed while abs had only a trial effect.
T-tests revealed only one statistically significant difference
between the data collected from successful missions and those
from the unsuccessful: subjects were more likely to have a
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successful mi_slon toward-the end'of iheir experimental
session. Although both squared and abs were derived from
the range and rate parameters on impact, neither parameter was
significantly different when calculated from a successful
mission or an unsuccessful one. While both values exhibited a
velocity effect implying that velocity had some impact on the
accuracy of the docking, this effect was not related to success
at all. Velocity played no role in the success of the mission.
In further corroboration, the t-test performed on velocity had a
statistic of 0 with a p value of 1 indicating a 0% assurance that
the populations are distinct.
CONCLUSIONS
As in earlier studies, researchers were unable to justify
utilization of the 0.1% rule or any other flight profiles
requiring an arbitrarily slow approach velocity from a human
factors point of view. Not only did faster approach velocities
fail to decrease safety during nominal operations, the presence
of an anomalous thruster firing during the mission did not alter
this result. Examination of human factors considerations
allows the operational flight envelope of a vehicle docking to a
space station, or any other object, to be expanded. This
permits more rapid and lower duration missions.
While engineering considerations, such as fuel consumption
(cost), overwhelmingly demonstrate the value of slow
missions, should fuel be made from waste water 19 or some
other source thereby decreasing its cost, a least time solution
would become a least cost solution as well. Also, for a vehicle
and/or pilot with 10 minutes worth of consumables remaining,
a 60 minute docking maneuver is not very helpful. An
understanding of the fastest safe docking technique will
always be necessary for contingencies that will inevitably
arise. Highly trained NASA pilot-astronauts with a mandatory
minimum 1000 hours jet experience should have no trouble
exceeding the performance values measured here. The safe
operating envelope of space vehicles can now be expanded
providing the ability to rescue a crewmember or vehicle low on
consumables.
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